With the 2020 U.S. presidential election less than 80 days away and the COVID-19 pandemic affecting the country’s daily operations, the political world has been center stage. Last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee released its lengthy, final report, Volume 5, on the Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election. Though the Intelligence Committee was Republican-led, the report is bipartisan, involving both Democrat and Republican input. The report is a three-year culmination of probing countless documents, interviews, and emails. The investigation resulted in what the committee considers, “the most comprehensive description to date of Russia’s activities and the threat they posed.” The report concluded: "The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election." The extensive, nearly 1,000 page report focused on various aspects of Russian interference in the 2016 election. Here are some key issues and takeaways of Volume 5.  (For our prior summaries, visit here for Volume 4 and Volume 1.

Paul Manafort's relationship with Russian individuals was a "grave counterintelligence threat"

Paul Manafort is a political consultant and former lobbyist who is known for having multiple ties to powerful politicians and businesspeople throughout the world, specifically Russia and Ukraine. In March 2016, Manafort was hired by the Trump Campaign as convention manager and by May 2016, he was promoted to chairman and chief strategist. The report stated the Trump campaign conducted “no known vetting of him, including his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence” (p. 27). The report further highlights that once Manafort was hired onto the Trump campaign, he quickly sought to use his position to resolve his various multi-million-dollar foreign disputes and acquire other work in Ukraine and other locations. Also, Manafort hired Russian national Konstantin Kilimnik, who served as a close liaison between Manafort and Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and other pro-Russia Ukrainian oligarchs. The committee found that “on numerous occasions, Manafort sought to pass sensitive internal polling data and campaign strategy to Kilimnik.” Though the committee was not able to find what Manafort and Kilimnik did with this information, there was continuous engagement between Manafort, an American campaign official and various Russian intelligence personnel. Moreover, "[a]fter the election, Manafort continued to coordinate with Russian persons, particularly Kilimnik and other individuals close to Deripaska, in an effort to undertake activities on their behalf. Manafort worked with Kilimnik starting in 2016 on narratives that sought to undermine evidence that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election." (p.6)  The bipartisan committee described Manafort's relationship “a grave counterintelligence threat” (p. vii). (As a part of the Mueller investigation, Manafort was convicted by a jury of various charges of tax and bank fraud.)

Michael Cohen negotiated with Russians to help secure approval for Trump Tower Moscow; Trump praised Putin

In September 2015, shortly after Donald Trump announced his candidacy, Trump and the Trump organization pursued a business deal in Russia. Michael Cohen, the Trump organization’s then executive vice president and Trump’s personal attorney, received two offers from Russian businessmen to create a Trump Tower in Moscow. The negotiations for this deal commenced from September 2015 to October 2015 until both parties agreed to a Letter of Intent (LOI) that laid out terms involving millions of dollars paid to the Trump organization. In November 2015, the LOI was signed. Cohen kept Trump informed on the status of the deal and while these negotiations were taking place, Trump made positive public comments throughout his campaign about Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. The report states that Cohen, “at various times understood that both Putin’s and Trump’s comments could be useful in advancing the deal,” (p. 407). Even dating back to 2007, Trump wrote a letter to Putin congratulating him on being named Time's "Man of the Year." However, the deal for Trump Tower Moscow fell through in summer of 2016.

2016 Trump Tower Meeting among Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya

In June 2016, a meeting was held in the Trump Tower in New York City. This meeting involved Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, Natalia Veselnitskaya, a Russian lawyer, and her four associates. The Committee found it very difficult to find evidence of the contents of this meeting and had to rely on conflicting witness testimony. However, the committee found that Donald Trump Jr. was expecting to receive “derogatory information” that would come from persons connected to the Russian government; however this information was never transmitted. Another alarming aspect of this meeting is the presence of Veselnitskaya. She is not only a Russian lawyer, but she has previously worked with and keeps in contact with various senior members of the Russian government. She has worked as defense counsel for the Russian government and a Russian business, Prevezon Holdings, in cases involving millions of dollars of fraud. The committee found her ties with powerful Russians, “extensive and concerning,” (p. ix).

Putin Ordered the Hack of DNC Computers; Wikileaks helped; Roger Stone was a liaison 

"The Committee found that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian effort to hack computer networks and accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and leak information damaging to Hillary Clinton and her campaign for president. Moscow's intent was to harm the Clinton Campaign, tarnish an expected Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and undermine the U.S. democratic process." (p. vii) Moreover, "Wikileaks actively sought, and played, a key role in the Russian influence campaign and very likely knew it was assisting Russian intelligence influence effort." (p. vii) In addition, "Trump and senior Campaign offici.als sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks's planned releases through Roger Stone." (p. vii)

The FBI’s Response to the DNC Hack

The committee also investigated an aspect of this issue that was not explored in Robert Mueller’s report from 2019. The committee investigated the FBI’s response to the DNC’s computer network hacking issue. From July 2015 to October 2016, the DNC was subject to Russian hacking. This was a novel issue given that a nation-state had never intentionally hacked an American private political party, taken information, and used it against a nation through leaking it publicly. The DNC was hesitant to have the FBI address this issue due to their ongoing investigation of Hillary Clinton’s email servers. What makes this issue even more complicated is during this hacking, the FBI was already looking into the domestic impact of foreign threats during a U.S. presidential election, so why did they not help the DNC sooner? The committee found that both the DNC and the FBI were not as communicative as they needed to be. The FBI also “lacked an appropriate process to escalate their warnings of the DNC hack within the DNC,” (p. 816).

FBI's Reliance on Steele Dossier 

The Committee also found the FBI should have verified the controversial Steele dossier that formed the basis of its investigation of Trump's possible connection with Russia: "Regarding the Steele Dossier, FBI gave Steele's allegations unjustified credence, based on an incomplete understanding of Steele's past reporting record. FBI used the Dossier in a FISA application and renewals and advocated for it to be included in the ICA before taking the necessary steps to validate assumptions about Steele's credibility. Further, FBI did not effectively adjust its approach to Steele's reporting once one of Steele's subsources provided information that raised serious concerns about the source descriptions in the Steele Dossier. The Corhinittee further found that Steele's reporting lacked rigor and transparency about the quality of the sourcing." (p. xix)

Committee Avoids Issue of "Collusion" with Russia

The one major issue that the report avoids specifically addressing is whether the Trump campaign colluded with Russia in the interference. Some Senators appended "Additional Views" on that issue. See pp. 941-952. 

--written by Mariam Tabrez

On Aug. 21, 2020, Mike Isaac and Sheera Frankel of the New York Times reported that Facebook is developing contingency plans just in case Donald Trump "wrongly claim[s] on the site that he won" contrary to the actual election results should they be against him. Facebook is also weighing how it should deal with Trump's attempts to delegitimize the actual election results by "by declaring that the Postal Service lost mail-in ballots or that other groups meddled with the vote." The source are "people with knowledge of Facebook's plans. Facebook is even considering creating a "kill switch" to remove political ads that contain false election results.

Breaking News: Facebook is laying out contingency plans in case President Trump attempts to delegitimize election results, including a political ad “kill switch" https://t.co/ZvXHsjkSyh

— The New York Times (@nytimes) August 21, 2020

Google is also discussing contingency plans for the U.S. elections, but didn't reveal further details.

It's not hard to envision another nightmare Bush v. Gore scenario, in which the result of the presidential election is contested. Trump has already attacked mail-in voting.  According to the NYT, in part due to the pandemic, 9 states have mailed ballots to all voters, while 34 other states allow voters to elect mail-in voting for any reason and 7 states allow mail-in voting for certain reasons.  Prof. Ned Foley has highlighted one reason this year's election may result in a contested outcome and litigation: mail-in ballots typically result in a "blue shift" with more ballots for Democrats than Republicans in past elections from mail-in ballots for reasons that are not entirely clear.  Thus, in close races, the "blue shift" might flip a state from Republican to Democrat when the mail-in votes are counted, giving rise to unsubstantiaed claims of foul play. For more about this scenario, read this Atlantic article. 

In July 2020, Facebook reported that it had removed nine networks of fake accounts, pages, and groups for violating its policies against coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB). As Facebook’s July 2020 CIB report explains, CIB means coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation, including both domestically non-government campaigns and activities on behalf of foreign entities. Facebook removed:

• 798 Facebook accounts
• 259 Instagram accounts
• 669 Facebook pages
• 69 Facebook groups.

Some of the fake accounts targeted U.S. users, ahead of the 2020 U.S. election. Facebook removed 35 Facebook accounts, 3 pages, and 88 Instagram accounts originating from a suspected Romanian troll farm. Facebook explained: “The people behind this network used fake accounts — some of which had already been detected and disabled by our automated systems — to pose as Americans, amplify and comment on their own content, and manage Pages including some posing as President Trump fan Pages. This network posted about US domestic news and events, including the upcoming November election, the Trump campaign and support for the campaign by African Americans, conservative ideology, Christian beliefs, and Qanon. They also frequently reposted stories by American conservative news networks and the Trump campaign.” According to NBC News, "Troll farms — groups of people that work together to manipulate internet discourse with fake accounts — are often outsourced and purchased by foreign governments or businesses to push specific political talking points."

The Romanian troll farm Facebook accounts were following a similar tactic of Russian operatives who posed as Black Lives Matter supporters to undermine Black voter supporter for Hillary Clinton. Similarly, Facebook found that some of the fake Romanian accounts posed as Black Trump supporters. The Romanian troll farm used hashtags like “Blackpeoplevotefortrump” and "We Love Our President" to post pro-Trump comments, spread information supporting the Republican Party and Qanon, and advertise Trump campaign. Altogether, these Romanian accounts allegedly drew around 1600 followers on Facebook and 7200 followers on Instagram. One example Facebook provided is shown below:

Fake "blackpeoplevotefortrump" account run by Romanian troll farm on Facebook

These fake accounts were taken down for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior, Facebook explained.

As reported by NBC News, Facebook also removed 303 Facebook accounts, 181 pages, 44 groups, and 31 Instagram accounts that were followed by 2 million people. These accounts were connected to Epoch Media Group, a pro-Trump media outlet. The accounts violated Facebook's policies against coordinated inauthentic behavior and foreign interference. This network operated from many regions around the globe and focused primarily on English and Chinese-speaking audiences globally. These accounts posted about news and comments related to the Chinese government such as the Hong Kong protests, the US administration’s policies towards China, the Falun Gong movement, conspiracy theories behind the US protests and COVID-19 misinformation, according to Facebook.  Additionally, Facebook said it linked this network to Truth Media, which was involved in Facebook’s previous investigation for violating policies against coordinated inauthentic behavior, spam and misrepresentation and which has now been banned on Facebook.

--written by Candice Wang

Facebook for has been under fire over the spread of misinformation connected with Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In April 2018, the idea for an independent oversight board was discussed when CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before Congress.

Overview of the Russian Interference Issue

The United States prides itself on having an open democracy, with free and fair elections decided by American voters. If Americans want a policy change, then the remedy most commonly called upon is political participation--and the vote. If Americans want change, then they should vote out the problematic politicians and choose public officials to carry out the right policies. However, what if the U.S. voting system is skewed by foreign interference? 

American officials are nearly unanimous in concluding, based on U.S. intelligence, that Russia interfered with the 2016 presidential elections [see, e.g., here; here; and Senate Intelligence Report].  “[U]ndermining confidence in America’s democratic institutions” is what Russia seeks. In 2016, few in the U.S. were even thinking about this type of interference. The US’s guard was down. Russia interfered with the election in various ways including fake campaign advertisements, bots on Twitter and Facebook that pumped out emotionally and politically charged content, and through spread of disinformation or “fake news.” Social media hacking, as opposed to physical-polling-center hacking, is at the forefront of discussion because it can not only change who is in office, but it also can shift American voters’ political beliefs and understanding of political topics or depress voters from voting. 

And, if you think Russia is taking a break this election cycle, you'd be wrong. According to a March 10, 2020 New York Times article, David Porter of the FBI Foreign Influence Task Force says: "We see Russia is willing to conduct more brazen and disruptive influence operations because of how it perceives its conflict with the West."

"David Porter, an assistant section chief with the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, accused Russia of conducting brazen operations aimed at spreading disinformation, exploiting" division and sowing doubt about the integrity of U.S. elections" @ETuckerAP https://t.co/D0WmNBfDWj

— Michael Tackett (@tackettdc) February 24, 2020

What Inteference Has to Do with Political Polarization

Facebook and Twitter have been criticized countless times by various organizations, politicians, and the media for facilitating political polarization. The U.S. political system of mainly two dominamnt parties is especially susceptible to political polarization. Individuals belonging to either party become so invested in those party’s beliefs that they do not just see the other party’s members as different but also wrong and detrimental to the future of the country. In the past twenty years, the amount of people who consistently hold conservative views or liberal views went from 10% to 20%, thus showing the increasing division, according to an article in Greater Good Magazine.

Political polarization is facilitated by platforms like Facebook and Twitter because of their content algorithms, which are designed to make the website experience more enjoyable. The Facebook News Feed “ranks stories based on a variety of factors including their history of clicking on links for particular websites,” as described by a Brookings article. Under the algorithm, if a liberal user frequently clicks on liberally skewed content, that is what they are going to see the most. Research shows this algorithm reduced the cross-cutting of political “content by 5 percent for conservatives and 8 percent for liberals.” Thus, the algorithm limits your view of other opinions.

So, you might ask, “Why is that bad? I want to see content more aligned with my beliefs.” Democracy is built on the exchange of varying political views and dissenting opinions. The US has long stood by the reputation of freedom of speech and encouraging a free flow of ideas. This algorithmic grouping of like-minded people can be useful when it comes to hobbies and interests, however when it comes to consistently grouping individuals based on political beliefs, it can have a negative impact on democracy. This grouping causes American users to live in “filter bubbles” that only expose them to content that aligns with their viewpoints. Users tend to find this grouping enjoyable due to the psychological theory of confirmation bias, which means that individuals are more likely to consume content that aligns with their pre-existing beliefs. So, all the articles about Trump successfully leading the country will be the first ranked on a conservative user’s Facebook newsfeed and will also be the most enjoyable for them. This filter bubble is dangerous to a democratic system because the lack of diverse perspectives when consuming news content encourages close-mindedness and increases distrust in anyone who disagrees.

During the 2016 presidential election, the Russian hackers put out various types of fake articles, campaign advertisements, and social media posts that were politically charged on either the liberal or conservative side. Because the Facebook algorithm shows more conservative content to conservatives and same for liberals, hackers had no problem reaching their desired audience quickly and effectively. On Facebook they created thousands of robot computer programs that would enter various interest groups and engage with their target audience. For example, in 2016, a Russian soldier successfully entered a U.S. Facebook group pretending to be a 42-year-old housewife, as reported by Time. He responded to political issues discussed on that group and he used emotional and political buzz words when bringing up political issues and stories. On Twitter, thousands of fake accounts run by Russians and computer robots were used to spread disinformation about Hillary Clinton by continuously mentioning her email scandal from when she was Secretary of State and a fake Democratic pedophilic ring called “Pizzagate.” These robots would spew hashtags like “#MAGA” and “#CrookedHillary” that took up more than a quarter of the content within these hashtags.

Facebook and Twitter’s Response to the 2016 Russian Interference

According to a Wall Street Journal article on May 26, 2020 and a Washington Post article on June 28, 2020, Facebook had an internal review of how Facebook could reduce polarization on its platform following the 2016 election, but CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other executives decided against the recommended changes because it was seen as "paternalistic" and would potentially affect conservatives on Facebook more. 

After becoming under increasing fire from critics for allowing misinformation and hate speech to go unchecked on Facebook, the company announced some changes to "fight polarization" on May 27, 2020. This initiative included a recalibration of each user’s Facebook News Feed which would prioritize their family and friends’ content over divisive news content. Their reasoning was that data shows people are more likely to have meaningful discourse with people they know, and this would foster healthy debate rather than ineffective, one-off conversations. They also mentioned a policy directly targeting the spread of disinformation on the platform. They say they have implemented an independent-fact-checking program that will automatically check content in over 50 languages around the world for false information.  Disinformation that will potentially contribute to “imminent violence, physical harm, and voter suppression,” will be removed. 

But those modest changes weren't enough to mollify Facebook's critics. Amidst the mass nationwide protests of the Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin's brutal killing of George Floyd, nonprofit organizations including Color for Change organized an ad boycott against Facebook. Over 130 companies agreed to remove their ads from Facebook during July or longer. That led Zuckerberg to change his position on exempting politicians from fact checking or the company's general policy on misinformation. Zuckerberg said that politicians would now be subject to the same policy as every other Facebook user and would be flagged if they disseminated misinformation (or hate speech) that violates Facebook's general policy. 

Twitter’s CEO Jack Dorsey not only implemented a fact-checking policy similar to Facebook, but also admitted that the company needed to be more transparent in their policy making. The fact checking policy “attached fact-checking notices” at the bottom of various tweets alerting users that there could be fake claims in those tweets.  Twitter also decided to forbig all political advertising on its platform. In response to Twitter's flagging of his content, President Trump issued an executive order to increase social media platform regulation and stop them from deleting users’ content and censoring their speech.

With the 2020 U.S. election only four months away, Internet companies are still figuring out how to stop Russian interference and the spread of misinformation, hate speech, and political polarization intended to interfere with the election. Whether Internet companies succeed remains to be seen.  But there's been more policy changes and decisions by Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Snapchat, Twitch, and other platforms in the last month than all of last year. 

-by Mariam Tabrez

On July 25, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published Volume I of a report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference.  The report stems from the committee’s bipartisan investigation into a wide range of Russian activities relating to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Volume I reaffirmed the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)  that  Russian intelligence accessed elements of multiple state or local electoral boards prior to the 2016 presidential election. According to the Report, DHS concluded that the Russian government likely researched the electoral system in place in all 50 states. In fact, by September 2017, DHS concluded that 21 states were explicitly targeted by Russian government cyber actors.

The Committee determined that “scanning” of election-related state infrastructure was the most widespread activity conducted by the Russian government prior to the election. Scanning is a form of reconnaissance where an adversary searches for weaknesses, access points, and vulnerabilities. Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting Director of Cyber Division for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, characterized these activities as “analogous to somebody walking down the street and looking to see if you are home. A small number of systems were unsuccessfully exploited, as though somebody had rattled the doorknob but was unable to get in . . . [however] a small number of the networks were successfully exploited. They made it through the door."

It should be noted that the Report provides no evidence that votes were changed, vote tallying systems were manipulated, or that any voter registration data was altered or deleted during the 2016 election cycle. Despite this, there is reason to believe that Russia will continue to escalate its interference in future elections. When testifying before the Committee, Michael Daniel, former Assistant and Cybersecurity Coordinator for President Obama, warned that mapping is done “so that [Russia] could actually understand the network [and] establish a presence so [they] could come back later and actually execute an operation.” Moreover, in an addendum providing the additional views of Senators Harris (D-CA), Bennet (D-CO), and Heinrich (D-NM), the Report states that “Russian operatives undoubtedly gained familiarity with our election systems and voter registration infrastructure—valuable intelligence that it may seek to exploit in the future.”

At the end of the Report, the Committee provided a comprehensive list of recommendations aimed at preventing Russia from interfering in future elections.

1.  Reinforce States' Primacy in Running Elections

The Committee recommends reinforcing the role of each state in administering elections while the federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information. This recommendation received pushback from Senator Wyden (D-OR) who calls for mandatory, nation-wide cybersecurity requirements. Wyden argues that Congress's constitutional role in regulating federal elections is well-established and that the Russian attacks are too complex and too serious to be left solely to state and local officials. Wyden went so far as to say that “[w]e would not ask a local sheriff to go to war against the missiles, planes and tanks of the Russian Army. We shouldn't ask a county election IT employee to fight a war against the full capabilities and vast resources of Russia's cyber army.”

2.  Create Effective Deterrence

The Committee recommends that the U.S. establish an international cyber doctrine to limit certain cyber activity. This doctrine would be similar to the existing international norms and treaties about the use of technologies and weapons systems. The government should treat a violation of this doctrine would be viewed as a hostile act and will be responded to appropriately. The Committee made it clear that the U.S. “should not limit its response to cyber activity; rather, it should create a menu of potential responses that will send a clear message and create significant costs for the perpetrator.”

3.  Improve Information Gathering and Sharing on Threats

The Committee recommends that the federal government, state governments, and local governments should establish clear channels of communication between one another. While this may seem rather rudimentary on its face, one of the key components of information sharing about elections is security clearances for appropriate officials at the state and local level. Since the 2016 election, DHS has compiled a list of officials to contact in every state if there is a threat. In addition, DHS is seeking to obtain security clearances for up to three election officials per state. Lastly, federal officials are working to declassify information in order to provide the greatest possible warning to state and local officials without compromising our own national intelligence.

4.  Secure Election-Related Cyber Systems

Despite the expense, the Committee recommends that cybersecurity needs to become a higher priority for election-related infrastructure. To do this, election officials should work with DHS to evaluate the security of their election systems, voter registration systems, state records, and other pre-election activities. The Report stated that in 2016, “cybersecurity for electoral infrastructure at the state and local level was sorely lacking.” The Committee additionally recommends that DHS creates an advisory panel to give expert-level advice on how states and localities run elections. Using this advice, DHS should develop procedures and processes to evaluate and routinely provide guidance on relevant vulnerabilities associated with voting systems.

5.  Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

The Committee recommends that states act with urgency to replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and remove (or render inert) any wireless networking capability. This is because paper ballots and optical scanners are the least vulnerable to cyber-attack. However, in order for paper ballots to be a legitimate means of tallying votes, there must be a secure chain of custody for those ballots. For this reason, the Committee recommends that states reexamine their safeguards against insertion of fraudulent paper ballots at the local level. Lastly, the Committee recommended that vendors of election equipment be briefed about the vulnerabilities in both the machines and the supply chains for the components of their machines.

6.  Assistance for the States

Finally, the Committee outlined its assessment of how the federal government can assist state and local governments in ensuring free and fair elections. State officials told the Committee the main obstacle to improving cybersecurity and purchasing more secure voting machines is cost. In March 2018, Congress appropriated $280 million in grants aimed at improving election security. Among other things, these funds will go toward replacing voting machines, hiring additional IT staff, updating software, and contracting with vendors to provide cybersecurity services. The Committee recommends that the Election Assistance Commission—the entity responsible for administering the grants—regularly report to Congress on how the states are using those funds, whether more funds are needed, and whether states have both replaced outdated voting equipment and improved cybersecurity.

Above all, this Report serves as a reminder that since 2014, Russia has been exploiting weaknesses in the American electoral system in order to sow discord and distrust among the American public. As former Deputy Director of the FBI, Andrew McCabe, told the Committee, the Russians “might not be effective the first time or the fifth time, but they are going to keep at it until they can come back and do it in an effective way." The committee plans to release several more installments of its report in the fall, focusing on the "Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of Russian interference, the Obama Administration’s response to Russian interference, the role of social media disinformation campaigns, and remaining counterintelligence questions."